

VI. 1 e.

ANSWER (COMUSKOREA 120501Z - SECRET):

1 e. With the exception of 1969, 8th United States Army statistics do not identify incidents of infiltrations as such, but rather treat incidents within 12 categories. Any of these incidents could be part of, or associated with, an infiltration attempt.

Definitions of Zones used:

Zone I - Military Demarcation Line to Civilian Control Line.

Zone II - Civilian Control Line to I Corps/First ROK Army rear boundary.

Zone III - South of I Corps/First ROK Army rear boundary.

Total Incidents by Year

<u>Zone I - US Sector</u>	<u>Zone II - ROK Army Sector</u>	<u>Zone II</u>	<u>Zone III</u>
1967 341	121	52	209
1968 378	164	96	123
1969 59	40	13	26

Detailed breakout of all types of incidents by year will accompany witnesses to Washington.

The prime reason for North Korea's infiltration of the ROK is subversion; that is, disseminate propaganda, organize the communist cells, promote distrust of/existing ROKG and recruit/exfiltrate ROK citizens for future employment as espionage/subversive agents. A second reason is espionage; collection of military, political and economic information on the ROK. During 1969 North Korean harassment of US and ROK

Forces in the DMZ has been considerably below levels established during 1967 and 1968. Incidents which have occurred probably stem from North Korean intelligence gathering and training activities, as well as reconnaissance in the DMZ area. North Korean agent training is known to include patrol and practice of infiltration exercises in forward areas. Some harassment of aggressive activity could be deception tactics to assist in infiltration or exfiltration of North Korean agents.

VI. 1. G.

ANSWER: (Seoul 687 - SECRET)

A. The average South Korean sees infiltration as evidence of the intention of KIM Il-sung's regime to reunify the peninsula by forceful means. Most South Koreans, either personally or in their families, suffered directly from 1950. They feel they know what reunification on North Korean terms would mean to them. While the exact number is not known, many thousands of officials, members of the managerial class and presumed anti-communists, were massacred by North Korean forces when they swept over the peninsula in the opening phase of the Korean War.

B. To a considerable extent, therefore, the success of the ROKG in countering infiltration and preventing North Korea from establishing operational base areas in South Korea is due to the cooperation of the public. Information on infiltrators has in many cases come from private citizens who often have acted at great danger to themselves. While inducements are offered for those who cooperate and punishment meted out to those who do not, these are not the sole or even major factors in inducing public cooperation.

C. On the positive side, there is considerable evidence that the lot of the average person in the south is better than that of the average person in the North, and this is generally

understood and believed. The gap is probably increasing. Certainly life is improving in the South in a visible manner. Most South Koreans thus have a stake in the continued existence of the Republic.

D. The threat from the north is a powerful unifying force. Outsiders may think that the threat is overstated from time to time, but South Koreans regard it as a continuing reality. When the situation is relatively quiet on the DMZ, as at present, the South Koreans regard this as a temporary tactic and point to other evidence of North Korean hostility.

2. What was the posture taken by the North Koreans, Soviet Union and the Red Chinese following each of the serious international incidents in the last several years connected with Korea?

Inasmuch as the Pueblo incident occurred two days after the capture of the North Korean infiltrators attempting to assassinate Park, was there a relationship between these two events?

ANSWER: (Seoul 687 - SECRET)

(First part)

A. The public attitude of North Korea varied according to the nature of the incident. In most major incidents involving Americans outside of the ROK -- Pueblo in January 1968, EC-121 in April 1969, and the OH-23 helicopter which strayed over North Korea and was shot down in August 1969 -- North Korea has taken the line that the actions were retaliatory and taken in defense of sovereignty. In these cases they sought to give the widest possible publicity to their actions.

B. In the case of incidents which took place within the ROK or involved ROK citizens abroad, North Korea disclaimed all connection. The Blue House raid in January 1968, the ambush of a UNC truck in the DMZ in April 1968, and the 120 man landing on the East Coast in November 1968 were widely publicized by North Korea, but were described as actions of patriotic ROK citizens engaged in armed uprising. In instances

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where agent boats were captured or sunk, their crews captured or killed and there was no doubt of their North Korean origin, the general practice was to simply avoid mention of the incident. When cases of spy ring in East Berlin and the United Revolutionary Party in the ROK were broken and clearly revealed North Korean involvement, North Korea ignored evidence and described the captured agents and recruits as ROK citizens inspired to revolt by the example of the North.

C. All of the above actions have had the desired effect from the North Korean point of view of enhancing the image of Kim Il-sung as an active revolutionary leader ever ready to challenge the U.S., leader of imperialism, and as a national hero universally admired by the entire Korean people. (The Department is better able to comment on Soviet and Chinese reactions.)

(Second Part)

North Korea today is one of the most isolated countries in the world. This situation is largely the result of deliberate choice. Secrecy surrounds the decision making process in Pyongyang and we have very little direct or indirect evidence as to how it operates. Accordingly, we have no verifiable means of determining if there is any relationship between the attempt to assassinate Park and the seizure of the Pueblo. We believe, however, that seizure of the Pueblo was neither planned

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long in advance nor especially timed to coincide with the
assassination attempt.

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C. The aggressive North Korean tactics of 1967-68 led not only to increased U.S. presence in South Korea, but also to increased U.S. support for the ROK. The North Koreans could logically decide that their best tactic in the circumstances is to minimize their aggressive activities at this time. Logic and predictability have not always been apparent in North Korean action. We do know, however, that there has been a lull in hostile actions along the DMZ for more than a year and a substantial reduction in other infiltration efforts dating back to late summer of 1969.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By PLM Date 3/12/12

VII. 1.

1. What South Korean Government programs to counter North Korean infiltration were in effect prior to the Blue House raid? What was the U.S. participation in these programs?

ANSWER: (COMUSKOREA TO DOD/ASA/ISA 120500Z Feb 70) SECRET

As a result of increase in infiltration by North Korean agents and raids across the armistice line in 1967, the ROKG developed Anti-infiltration Measures Program, otherwise known as ROK Presidential Instruction Number 18. This instruction, published December 15, 1967:

- A. Delineated responsibilities between government departments;
- B. Established Counterinfiltration Central Coordination Council;
- C. Divided Republic into sector defense commands for counterinfiltration operations;
- D. Provided for coastal patrols; and
- E. Established defensive zones south of the DMZ.

In coordination with the development of this program, the UN Command and UN Forces Korea developed the Counterinfiltration-Counterguerrilla Concept and Requirements Plan (CIGCOREP), which was submitted to CINCPAC October 3, 1967. U.S. funding for this program was \$28 million, of which 99 percent has been delivered. The concept involves three interlaced courses of action to:

- A. Increase US/ROK capabilities in the DMZ and in adjacent areas:

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B. Increase capabilities to protect the seaward approaches and to thwart landings of agent teams or resupply missions on the shore;

C. Improve ROK counteragent team capabilities in the interior to include better protection of possible key targets;

The Korean National Police five-year operation plan (FY 67 through FY 71) was developed prior to the Blue House raid. The U.S. contribution to this program was made June 30, 1966, through USAID and amounted to \$250,000. This money was provided to finance the costs of procurement, to include transportation of:

A. Portable two-way communications equipment for ROK KNP anti-infiltration sweep teams and fixed two-way equipment installations for the KNP at combined intelligence-gathering centers.

B. Selected conventional personal weapons, such as shotguns, for KNP sweep team personnel.

VII. 2.

2. What new programs were established subsequent to the Blue House raid? The major landing in the fall of 1968? In both cases give U.S. participation or contribution of equipment or financial support.

ANSWER: (COMUSKOREA to DOD/ASA/ISA 120500Z Feb 70) SECRET

Subsequent to Blue House raid, several addenda to ROK Presidential Instruction Number 18 were issued which:

- A. Revised list of major national installations requiring protection;
- B. Published detailed responsibilities of Central Counterinfiltration Coordination Council and Counterinfiltration Operations Center;
- C. Made minor changes in sector responsibilities.

Presidential Instruction Number 19 was issued which outlined improved reporting procedures. In April 1968 President Park activated the Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF) with the goal of eventually attaining a strength of 2.5 million men.

In February 1968, a Joint State/Defense Message directed UNC to:

- A. Convince the ROKG that the Blue House raid and Pueblo seizure, while related, must be dealt with by different measures;
- B. Hopefully resolve Pueblo problem through exhaustive private negotiations;

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C. Visibly strengthen ROK military posture to enhance ROK ability to repel and punish infiltrators. President Johnson asked Congress for a \$100 million supplemental appropriation to provide additional military assistance to the ROK.

Also, in response to Blue House raid, USAID support to Korean National Police increased on May 31, 1968 by \$5 million. The project is designed to improve KNP's overall capability to counter acceleration of subversive agent infiltration from the North. The U.S. contribution is to be used to procure:

- A. Communications equipment and supplies;
- B. Transportation equipment and supplies;
- C. Weapons;
- D. Ammunition, flares and grenades;
- E. Training films, aids and equipment.

Subsequent to the landings in the fall of 1968, Presidential Instruction Number 24 was issued:

- A. Outlined ground/sea police operations and command responsibilities;
- B. Provided for following countermeasures in identified vulnerable areas:
 - (1) Collectivization of 13,596 isolated farm families;
 - (2) Improvement of road network (567.8 km);

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- (3) Improvement of communications network;
- (4) Construction of 1,258 helipads.

As of December 12, 1969, the aforementioned HDRF had 2,082,294 personnel and 1,426,657 weapons. 162,927 of these weapons were provided for ROK resources. Other than furnishing of some weapons by U.S., program is supported by won budget. Although recently organized, HDRF turned in credible performance during Ulchin landings.

To meet increased NK threat, CINCUNC submitted time-phased counterinfiltration guerrilla force improvement requirements (CIGFIR) package on January 15, 1969. The program, except for dollar figures, was coordinated with ROK services,

VII. 3.

3. What role in general do U.S. forces have in the South Korean counter-infiltration program?

What limitations, if any, exist on U.S. participation?

ANSWER: (COMUSKOREA TO DOD/ASA/ISA 120500Z Feb 70) SECRET

U.S. forces are responsible for internal security of own facilities and counterinfiltration operations within tactical sector of 2nd U.S. Infantry Division along DMZ. Counterinfiltration operations, except for these areas, are responsibility of ROKG. Role of U.S. forces is limited to providing advice, training and equipment for ROK counterinfiltration activities. U.S. combat service support, combat support and combat units are provided on an as-requested basis. Furnishing of support is determined on case-by-case basis. U.S. resources are committed only when evident ROK resources are inadequate in coping with task.

VII. 4.

4. On an annual basis, since 1964, describe U.S. casualties to North Korean infiltrators outside the DMZ area. Include attacks on U.S. Army property or facilities.

ANSWER: (COMUSKOREA to DOD/ASA/ISA 120500Z Feb 70) SECRET

U.S. casualties by year outside the DMZ and Zone I.

U.S. casualties in Zone I (area south of the southern boundary of the DMZ and north of the civilian control line) included in fact sheet response to question 3d, Section IV, U.S. forces missions and programs.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Incident</u>	<u>U.S. Casualties</u> <u>KIA/WIA/MIA</u>
Year 1964	None	
Year 1965	None	
Year 1966	None	
Year 1967 - 21 July	- Assault (DR 744838)	0 / 2 / 0
Year 1968 - 24 January	- Assault (CS 135925)	1 / 0 / 0
Year 1969	None	

VII. 5.

5. Why have not the infiltrators made regular attacks on U.S. military facilities?

ANSWER: (COMUSKOREA TO DOD/ASA/ISA 120500Z Feb 70) SECRET

The answer is, as in all cases where North Korean reasoning is concerned, that we do not know. Interrogation of captured infiltrators reveals they have not been assigned such tasks and only one attack on a U.S. facility has taken place in many years. This one occurred in 1966 and took place close to the DMZ.

It should be noted that ROK facilities have also been generally immune from attack. In fact, one of the mysteries is why the North Koreans have not resorted to sabotage of important installations, as well as military facilities.

VII. 6.

6. What bonuses does the ROK Government pay for civilians or military personnel who aid in the capture or killing of infiltrators?

ANSWER: (Seoul 709, CONFIDENTIAL)

A. The ROKG pays 200,000 won (\$660) to anyone who furnishes information leading to capture of an agent or who makes such a capture, even if the agent is unavoidably killed during apprehension. The informant or arresting officer is also entitled to one-half of any seized money. If more than one person is involved in reporting and capture, the reward is split. If a government agent makes a capture on the basis of information supplied by a civilian, all reward money goes to the civilian.

B. In order further to spur interest, the ROKG is considering raising the reward to one million won (\$3,300) plus a maximum of 500,000 won of captured money.

VII. 7.

7. Do some trucks used by the Korean police sent to control rioting students have the AID hand-clasp emblem on them? Is this because that emblem is statutorily required on all such items provided by AID?

ANSWER: (Seoul 709 CONFIDENTIAL)

AID-financed vehicles with the clasped-hands emblem on them were used by the Korean National Police at the outbreak of university student activities in Seoul in late June and early July 1969. The U.S. Mission was seriously concerned with use of these vehicles for this purpose.

Immediately following these disturbances, the universities affected were closed by the ROKG ahead of schedule for the summer recess. At the time of the scheduled reopening of the universities, the Mission on August 25 informed the Director General of the Korean National Police of USG concern with the use of AID-furnished equipment for other than counter-infiltration purposes, and requested the emblems be removed from all vehicles and equipment furnished by AID. The Director General agreed to do so and by September 5 emblems had been removed from all vehicles and equipment in the Seoul area. By October 2 this action had been completed throughout the rest of the country.

The requirement for the use of the emblem is based on AID policy not statute. The policy and procedures are set forth

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in AID M.O. 1414.6 and M.O. 1454.11. Administrative discretion is provided to waive the requirement and such action was taken in this case.

VII. 8.

8. What is the procedure for informing the U.S. command of South Korean incursions into the North?

ANSWER: (COMUSKOREA TO DOD/ASA/ISA 120500 Z Feb 70) SECRET

Memorandum of Agreement between ROKA and EUSA requires that unilateral clandestine operations will be coordinated with appropriate counterpart a minimum of 48 hours in advance.

Memorandum of Agreement between ROKAF and PACAF states both parties shall continue to collect aerospace intelligence of mutual interest and bilateral collection efforts will be directed against North Korea and other mutually defined and agreed upon areas. Unilateral activities are not discussed in the Memorandum of Agreement.

Incursions such as forays and retaliations conducted by the ROKG into North Korea are neither sanctioned by nor coordinated with CINCUNC. A Memorandum of Agreement is being staffed by COMUSK which would be negotiated with the ROK MND. Memorandum of Agreement would require COMUSK be informed prior to initiation of all unilateral clandestine intelligence collection missions into North Korea, since it appears that these missions have, on occasion, been used as a cover to conduct forays and retaliations.

VII. 9.

9. What are the ASU, AIU and 5796 units? Do these units conduct raids in the North? In what ways do we support these units?

ANSWER: (COMUSKOREA TO DOD/ASA/ISA 120500 Z Feb 70) SECRET

ASU is the abbreviation for Army Security Units which are subordinate units of the ROK Army Security Command (ASC). The command was formerly known as the Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) units now called Army Security Units previously designated CIC detachments. Army Security Command dates from earliest days of ROKA in late 1950s. Prior to military revolution of May 1961, it was an investigative organization concerned not only with military security but also with investigations of civilian population. Following the military revolution, CIC was placed under control of the newly-organized ROK Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The corps continued under control of the ROK CIA until 1963 when control reverted to ROKAMWR. In September 1968 the CIC was redesignated ASC-TO&E but remained basically the same, but Commanding General was promoted from MG to LTG. There are Army Security Units (ASU) at field army, corps and division levels. There are 6 ASUs in Viet-Nam. Nineteen area units are located in major ROK cities and towns and 151 resident offices, one for each Gun (country), in ROK. The mission of the ASC, and subordinate ASUs, is to secure the military establishment against sabotage, espionage and subversive

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activity. The ROKG has always interpreted investigation of subversive activity to include coverage of civilian as well as military sphere, but probably most important ASC role is to provide the government with information on political inclinations of ROKA personnel. Neither the ASC nor the ASUs are known to conduct raids into NKM. ASC is MAP supported.

AIU is the ROKA intelligence unit, with the mission of collecting information of intelligence value as required by ROKA. AIU's main objective is to establish effective networks which will give early warning of imminent hostilities. Clandestine intelligence collection is primarily targeted on order of battle information. MAP support is provided to the ROK AIU, mainly in logistical field in the form of vehicles and POL. The primary agency for ROK forays and retaliation activities is the ROK AIU. The size of raiding parties have ranged from one man to (very rarely) platoon size (60 men) elements. Most raiding parties consisted of five to twelve men. Mission targets have included killing army soldiers by attacking barracks, patrols, water points, ground posts and mining travel routes; sabotage targets included barracks, guard posts, propaganda loudspeakers, regimental command post and division command posts. CINCUNC has not sanctioned aforementioned activities, nor were they coordinated with CINCUNC. Retaliation activities have been few in number.

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The great preponderance of AIU activities have been one man missions of short duration with the objective of obtaining operational information on the North Korean units immediately across the MDL.

Information on the 5796 Unit should be sought from the Director, National Security Agency.

VII. 10.

10. To what extent has the United States or its personnel supported South Korean infiltration into the North? Have American military personnel ever accompanied South Korean forces on raids into North Korea?

ANSWER: (COMUSKOREA TO DOD/ASA/ISA 120500Z Feb 70) SECRET

The USFK has not supported ROK infiltration into the North. U.S. military personnel have not and do not accompany ROK forces on raids or incursions into North Korea.

IV. 1.

1. Provide a summary of major U.S. forces in Korea, including:
 - a. Size over the past three years.
 - b. Mission today and mission when unit first established in Korea (including date).
 - c. In the case of Army units, their function, or services to the two divisions in Korea.

IV. 3.

3. With regard to the DMZ:

- a. Provide a map showing where the two U.S. divisions and South Korean forces are stationed along the DMZ and immediate area to the south. Show numbers of U.S. forces and Korean forces deployed.
- b. When and how was the decision made as to which area along the DMZ would be patrolled by U.S. forces? Has this situation changed since the original decision? If so, in what way?
- c. For the past five years provide the annual casualty figures for U.S. troops along the DMZ, indicating the type of action that led to the casualties where possible.
- d. Has the U.S. ever proposed withdrawing any or all of its forces from the DMZ? What was the response, if any?
- e. What would be the estimated response from South and North Koreans if the U.S. cut the size of its responsibilities along the DMZ to one brigade; one battalion; one company?
- f. Provide a list of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army aircraft that regularly fly along the DMZ. Include the frequency of their flights and the missions. Also indicate ^{what} the North Korean response is to these flights.

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ANSWER (Seoul 677 - CONFIDENTIAL):

d. To the Embassy's knowledge no such proposal has been made to the ROKB.

ANSWER (Seoul 668 - SECRET)

e. A. From a political standpoint the US troop presence on the DMZ serves as a visible guarantee of US involvement in the event of major hostilities. As such it is both a reassurance to the ROK and a deterrent to the North. In this light reduction in itself, even to a minimum level, would not significantly alter this basic role. North Korea's readiness to mount overt hostilities would not automatically increase in proportion to the decrease in the size of the US presence on the DMZ. The critical point is how both sides would view such a reduction as an indication of further US intentions.

B. Based on North Korea's reaction to the Vietnamization program we could expect reductions to be denounced initially as a fraud to mislead world opinion over our continuing aggressive designs. Before making any change in its basic position, however, North Korea would look at the total US presence in Korea and estimate the US intention to honor its security treaty commitment. US troops on the DMZ are only one element in this equation.

C. Even if carefully prepared in advance, the ROK public would probably view such deployment with some apprehension. This could be mitigated in time and replaced by pride in assuming increased responsibility for its own defense. There would probably be a request from the ROKG for modernization and augmentation of ROK equipment on grounds of the increased defense burden. In short, the only real answer that can be given to the question is that it all depends on the circumstances at the time.

2. Provide the total amount of U.S. military-related expenditure in Korea or for Koreans in Vietnam for the past five years. Include:

- a. Costs of U.S. military presence in Korea, including military pay.
- b. U.S. military assistance, both budget support and equipment.
- c. U.S. military-related purchases in Korea.
- d. U.S. support of Koreans in Vietnam.
- e. U.S. military construction in Korea.
- f. What is the foreign exchange cost of the U.S. military presence in Korea?

POL 27. Symington Subcommittee

1970